This paper examines the impact of an incumbent carrier's participation in two simultaneously
These comments, which followed the AWS-1 Order on Reconsideration, echoed the twin regulatory goals of providing additional opportunities for smaller and rural wireless carriers and enhancing flexibility for potential licensees. The Small Entity Compliance Guide for the first AWS auction, which the FCC published on August 9, 2006, laid out the key changes that were subsequently made:
The new rules both limit the award of designated entity benefits if any applicant or licensee has a "material relationship" created by certain agreements with one or more entities for the lease or resale of its spectrum capacity, and set out new standards for the payment of unjust enrichment See 47 C.F.R. § § 1.2110(b)(3)(iv)(A) -(B) (designated entities) and 1.2111 (unjust enrichment).
Under these amended rules, larger companies have a more difficult time creating fronts to take part in set-aside auctions.
The changes were also interpreted by Copps, who stated on April 25, 2006, "I am pleased that by strengthening our unjust enrichment rules we take away the incentives for speculators to try to masquerade as legitimate DEs. Under our new rules, bidders who benefit from the 25 percent discount must forfeit that discount if they then turn around and sell some or all of their rights to someone else… I am also pleased that we commit to thoroughly review the application and all relevant documents for each and every winning bidder claiming DE status. Additionally, we pledge to audit every DE at least once during the initial license term." Ayres and Cramton (1996) demonstrate how set-asides and bidding credits impact competition and prices in auctions. If only weaker bidders (non-incumbents) can bid on the setaside licenses, the impact of the set-aside auction is to lower prices for the weaker bidders and raise prices for the stronger bidders (incumbents). This creates an incentive for incumbents to participate in the set-aside (closed) auction through a front. Csirik (2002) finds that revenues from FCC Auction 35 actually rose as a result of the discounted pricing. While some licenses are given out cheap, Csirik argues that the extra that Verizon had to pay as a result was the dominant effect of the discount regime. Furthermore, Csirik finds that overall the DE rules had little effect on the allocation of the biggest licenses between the various participants. In contrast to Csirik, who simulates a world without DE status at all, this paper isolates the effects on the auction of the AT&T's participation through Native
Alaska. This paper focuses on outcomes in a world with DE status where DE status cannot be abused, rather than a world completely devoid of DE status. Bajari and Fox (2005) find that simultaneous ascending auctions for spectrum may allow the market to sort for geographic complementarities. However, the auction design might also result in an inefficient equilibrium, due to implicit collusion. This paper builds on that research by extending analysis to auctions where some participants may not bid on all offerings, and where different participants must bid on the same products at different prices. This paper attempts to quantify (1) the extent to which prices in the closed auction were inflated by the participation of Alaska Native, and (2) the extent to which prices in the open auction were deflated by the lack of participation by incumbent carriers. It is found that the use of bidding fronts significantly raised prices in the closed auction and significantly lowered prices in the open auction. The paper then reviews the FCC's control standard in Auction 35 and compares it to the control standard used in the first AWS auction, which was completed in September 2006.
The study finds that the revised control standard the FCC used during the AWS auction is superior to the control standard used for Auction 35 and is more likely to improve the viability of small and rural wireless carriers to the extent that the FCC believes that small carriers are necessary for a competitive wireless market in the United States.
The paper is organized as follows: Part II provides a brief introduction to the FCC's set-aside program and explains how at least one company exploited the FCC's control standards. 6 In Part III, the results of Auction 35 are summarized. This paper examines the three primary channels in which Alaska Native's participation adversely affected legitimate entrepreneurs in the closed auction. First, Alaska Native obtained licenses that would have otherwise been awarded to entrepreneurs. Second, Alaska Native's bids increased the prices that legitimate entrepreneurs paid for fourteen closed licenses on which Alaska Native was the last bidder to drop out. Third, by driving up prices in first-tier markets, Alaska Native forced value-seeking bidders to turn their attention towards second-tier markets, thereby inflating prices in markets where Alaska Native never submitted a bid.
Part IV simulates prices in a but-for world in which AT&T competed against other incumbent
carriers in the open auction. In the closed auction, the demand for spectrum would shift in, thereby generating lower prices. In the open auction, the demand for spectrum would shift out, and higher prices would result. Econometric techniques are used to construct the demand curves in the open and closed auctions under the assumption that AT&T was allowed to bid only in the open auction. The intersection of the supply curve and the reconstructed demand curves represent the predicted prices.
The paper concludes with a brief analysis of the FCC's screening process for entrepreneurs.
Although the FCC's definition of control could promote an efficient auction, it could sacrifice diversity and competition after the auction. The FCC's understanding of control is not grounded in economic thought. This paper suggests that sophisticated entities such as NextWave and AT&T render the FCC's affirmative action program ineffective. Moreover, the FCC appears to be incapable (or unwilling) to enforce the Congressional mandate of diversity in the airwaves.
THE FCC'S SET-ASIDE PROGRAM AND THE CREATION OF BIDDING FRONTS
In this Part, this paper introduces the FCC's set-aside program in Auction 35 and explains how certain savvy carriers exploited the FCC's affirmative action policies.
THE PARTITIONING OF THE NEXTWAVE LICENSES BY THE FCC
After years of administering a duopoly in the provision of cellular wireless service, the FCC allocated additional spectrum for personal communications services (PCS) to promote greater competition in the wireless telecommunications industry. Beginning in the mid-1990s, the Commission defined geographic service areas, apportioned six additional licenses per service area, and auctioned those licenses to wireless providers. Those licenses were called the A, B, C, D, E, and F blocks. Notwithstanding the appropriate classification of specialized mobile radio (SMR) providers such as Nextel, 7 under the Commission's licensing arrangement, the maximum number of unique personal communication services (PCS) providers that could obtain spectrum at auction in a given license area was six-that is, one distinct carrier per block. However, PCS licenses can be disaggregated. Were a PCS provider to sell only a portion of its spectrum purchased at auction, the number of providers in a given license area could, in theory, exceed six.
With the passage of the 1994 amendments to the Communications Act of 1934, Congress instructed the Commission to pursue a combination of objectives when allocating spectrum, including a diversity objective. In particular, Congress required the Commission to adopt spectrum allocation procedures that would create opportunities for entrants in the wireless telecommunications industry (H.R. Rep. No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., at 254 (1993) ). The
Commission satisfied that mandate, in part, by setting aside the C and F blocks (two of the six blocks of PCS spectrum) for "entrepreneurs." A central purpose of Congress's diversity mandate was to promote greater competition-more carriers in the wireless industry would likely produce lower prices and greater choice for wireless consumers. In addition to using set-asides to promote competition, the Commission placed restrictions on the total amount of spectrum any single carrier could own in a given license area.
Although competition in the mobile telephony sector has increased significantly since the first broadband PCS auction, 8 roughly 20 percent the available spectrum was tied up in bankruptcy proceedings for several years (FCC's Fifth CMRS Report). In the original C-block auction, the FCC offered to finance the winning bids of entrepreneurs (including NextWave's $4.7 billion of winning bids) with a generous payment schedule. In particular, the FCC allowed winning bidders to make interest-only payments, at a below market interest rate, for six years and payments of principal and interest amortized over the remaining four years of the license term (FCC's Sixth Report, July 18, 1995) . Certain bidders exploited the FCC's rules by bidding beyond their means, and then declaring bankruptcy when the payments came due. Therefore, rather than adding a new competitor in the wireless sector, the FCC's policy managed to retain the status quo.
The original C-block auction was an embarrassment for the Commission. Although it felt compelled to devise some form of a diversity program, the Commission would not err in the same direction. Auction 35 was a re-auction of spectrum that was previously auctioned in the C-and Fblock auctions and subsequently confiscated by the Commission when NextWave and other winning bidders defaulted on payment obligations. In Auction 35, the Commission classified the returned spectrum into large markets (cities with over 2.5 million residents) and small/medium markets (cities with less than 2.5 million residents). 9 In small/medium license areas, the Commission divided the returned spectrum into three parts: two parts for "entrepreneurs" (the "closed" auction) and one part for incumbents (the "open" auction) . In large license areas, the Commission set aside only one-third of the spectrum for entrepreneurs.
To determine an applicant's eligibility to bid in the closed auction-that is, to determine whether an applicant was genuinely an "entrepreneur"-the Commission adopted a "controlling interest" standard (FCC Public Notice, September 6, 2000) . In particular, the controlling interest standard prohibits any applicant who is controlled by a firm with either significant assets (in excess of $500 million) or significant revenues (in excess of $125 million over the past two years)
to bid on closed licenses. 10 The FCC's control standard would presumably prohibit the participation by a large, incumbent carrier such as AT&T.
11
Although the FCC set aside licenses to "entrepreneurs" who would not have to compete with major phone companies, it revised its rules in August 2000 so that these entrepreneurs could as much. In a series of securities filings, it has disclosed that its ability to conduct its own wireless telecommunications operations depended significantly on Alaska Native obtaining licenses in the closed auction. 13 According to company officials, "Alaska Native gives us greater flexibility for bidding on the spectrum that is available. Short of buying Alaska Native outright, AT&T could benefit by negotiating a low-cost 'roaming' agreement with the upstart" (Wall Street Journal, January 5, 2000: B1).
Similarly, Council Tree officials have admitted that they had no intention of actually operating a wireless telephone network, and instead view their participation in Alaska Native simply as an "investment." In this regard, they have a right after five years to require that AT&T or its affiliates purchase for as much as $1 billion the equity interests in Alaska Native previously acquired by them for a small fraction of that amount. 14 
Markets in Which Alaska Native Won the License
Alaska Native won 29 closed licenses that were set apart for small entrepreneurs. Because of the company's substantial financial assets and its backing by AT&T, Alaska Native continued bidding on those closed licenses well beyond the "reservation price" of the qualified DEs.
Consequently, Alaska Native was the dominant bidder in the closed segment of Auction 35. As Table 1 shows, Alaska Native won 29 closed licenses covering 60.3 million people. 17 ). Table 1 here
By winning closed licenses specifically set aside for legitimate entrepreneurs, Alaska Native undermined the FCC's diversity objective, which was to allow smaller companies to acquire spectrum and compete against incumbents in the wireless industry.
Markets in Which Alaska Native Was the Last Bidder to Drop Out
The FCC auction continues as long as a bidder is willing to bid higher on one or more licenses. As soon as the price of a license reaches or exceeds the reservation price of one of the two remaining bidders, that bidder drops out and the competition for that license ends. Therefore, the last bidder to end the bidding for a license sets the price of the license. By submitting bids on closed licenses that it eventually does not win, Alaska Native inflated the prices for legitimate entrepreneurs that ultimately won those licenses. Assuming AT&T's presence did not significantly change market structure, if Alaska Native had not participated in the closed auction, the qualified DE with the second-highest reservation price would have set the price of the license in each market. Table 2 illustrates the results for those markets in which Alaska Native was the last bidder to drop out. Table 2 here
As Table 2 shows, Alaska Native set the price in fourteen closed license areas. Alaska Native placed second-to-high bids totaling $296.1 million for licenses in those markets. The table also lists, for each market, the final bid by the last legitimate entrepreneur before Alaska Native to drop out of the auction. Legitimate entrepreneurs placed third-to-high bids totaling $257.7 million in those license areas. By this measure, Alaska Native's participation in the closed portion of the auction increased prices paid by winning bidders by $38.4 million (equal to $296.1 million less $257.7 million).
3.1.3. Markets in Which Alaska Native Induced a Value-Seeking Firm to Bid in a Second-Tier
Market
In addition to increasing directly the prices of closed licenses, Alaska Native's participation in the closed portion of the auction indirectly increased prices for markets in which Alaska Native never bid. In particular, Alaska Native's participation induced some value-seeking firms to abandon their plans to acquire spectrum in first-tier markets of the closed auction and to start bidding in second-tier markets instead. For example, because of the participation of Alaska Native in first-tier markets, value-seeking firms like Leap, Northcoast, and 3DL were forced to refocus their interests in the second-tier closed markets, which, for those bidders, were not as
valuable. An analysis of the bidding reveals that Leap diverted its interests toward San Antonio and Austin (away from Dallas and Houston), Columbus (away from Cincinnati), and Providence (away from Boston). Leap would place less value on these second-tier markets either because they have lower population density than Leap's preferred markets, or because they do not fit as well with Leap's current footprint. A press statement from Leap's chief executive officer released shortly after the auction further supports the value-seeking strategy employed by Leap:
We used the auction as an efficient, selective way to target the right markets at the right price. Because of our disciplined bidding, we achieved the lowest average price per POP among the ten most active bidders in the auction. This supports our goal to be a wireless carrier with one of the most efficient cost structures in the country (PR Newswire, January 26, 2001: 1).
Shortly before the auction ended, a Leap senior vice president suggested that "the company will leave the auction with far less spectrum than it wanted because competition from entrepreneurs backed by big companies has driven up prices" (Wall Street Journal, January 5, 2001: B1).
Similarly, Northcoast Communications did not prefer to bid in second-tier closed markets.
Alaska Native's participation in the auction for closed licenses in first-tier markets inflated the prices in those markets and forced Northcoast to redirect its interests to second-tier spectrum.
Like Leap, Northcoast followed a value-seeking strategy by trying to acquire first-tier licenses at affordable prices in the closed auction. Northcoast's reluctance to bid in second-tier licenses is evidenced by its late entry in second-tier markets. Table 3 lists each of the markets in which Northcoast bid, the round in which it placed its first bid, the population of the market, and whether Northcoast ultimately won the license. As Table 3 illustrates, Northcoast placed its initial bid on most second-tier licenses well after round fourteen of the auction. Table 3 here
The mean population of the markets in which Northcoast bid before and after round fourteen are computed. The mean population of the markets in which Northcoast bid by round fourteen were more than four times as large as the markets in which Northcoast placed its first bid after round fourteen. The markets in which Northcoast bid before round fourteen were classified as first tier markets by the FCC (population larger than 2.5 million), while the markets in which the company expressed interest after round fourteen were second-tier markets (population less than 2.5 million) (FCC Public Notice, September 6, 2000). 17 Such evidence suggests that Northcoast bid for second-tier licenses only after its most desired market became too expensive.
The effect of a shift in demand by value-seeking firms such as Leap and Northcoast toward second-tier properties was an increase in the price of second-tier markets. Hence, even legitimate entrepreneurs that did not bid directly against Alaska Native felt its presence.
RESULTS OF THE OPEN AUCTION
The 
ESTIMATING THE BUT-FOR PRICES IN THE CLOSED AUCTION
As stated above, Alaska Native paid $2.6 billion to win 29 closed licenses that represented 36 percent of the population-weighted spectrum made available in the entire closed auction, and 50 percent of that spectrum on a dollar-weighted basis. Below, the process of bidding in an FCC spectrum auction is explained, and then the concept of supply and demand within the concept of the FCC's spectrum auction formation is reviewed. This paper then introduces a supply and demand model that defined the market equilibrium in the closed auction, and estimates that model to determine the effect of AT&T's bidding on the closed licenses on the average prices paid the closed licenses.
BIDDING IN AN FCC SPECTRUM AUCTION
The FCC's spectrum auctions are multiple round ascending price auctions. 19 In any given auction, the FCC lets a specific number of spectrum licenses for sale and establishes minimum bid prices (reserve prices) for each license. Bidding occurs during rounds. At the start of an auction, rounds may last as long as two hours. Toward the end of the auction, when very few bids are submitted, rounds may be as short as 5 or 10 minutes.
At the start of a round, the FCC announces the current price of a license and the minimum price at which it will accept a new bid for that license in the subsequent round. A valid bid must be at least as high as that minimum price. In most auctions, bidders may exceed that minimum Currently, the FCC specifies bid increments as a percentage of the current price of a license.
Increments typically range between 20 percent and 5 percent of the current price of the license.
The percent increment depends on largely on the number of new bids submitted for the license in the prior round. The more bids there were in the prior round, the higher the increment will be.
Therefore, increments are typically 20 percent near the start of the auction, when bidding is intense, and gradually decrease to 5 percent as the auction ends. With the exception of the very last round of the auction, in which no new bids are submitted, the average price of spectrum is, by construct, higher than that of the previous round. Hence, the name ascending price auction accurately describes an FCC spectrum auction.
To be eligible to bid in an FCC auction, a bidder must make an initial down payment. The size of a bidder's down payment determines the maximum quantity of spectrum, expressed in MHz-pop, it can bid on at auction. Small regional operators who are interested only in a few licenses typically make small initial payments to bid only on those few licenses. National carriers typically make large payments that allow them to bid simultaneously on all licenses at auction, so long as those licenses are not set-aside for small carriers.
Each bidder has a specific demand for spectrum. The auction ends when prices rise high enough so that no new bids are submitted. When this occurs, the sum of all bidders' individual quantities demanded for spectrum will equal the fixed quantity of spectrum that the FCC has let at auction. Put simply, the market clears when supply equals demand. The market demand curve is the sum of the individual bidder's demands. Therefore, to calculate AT&T's impact on prices in the closed auction, AT&T's quantity demanded for closed spectrum is subtracted in each auction round from the market demand in the closed auction. In particular, Performing this calculation for all rounds, the demand curve for open spectrum is estimated as [13] ˆ( ) (
With this equation, the price that would have occurred at the fixed supply of 2.32 billion MHzPop in the open portion of the auction is estimated. Further, the price obtained in this last step is used to predict the quantity of spectrum that AT&T would have won in the open, given their demand for total spectrum, and its savings from having bid in the closed is calculated.
ESTIMATING AT&T'S DEMAND FOR SPECTRUM
First, AT&T's demand for spectrum in each round of the auction, at the average price per
MHzPop in the entire auction, is determined. 23 The price for spectrum ranged from $0.10 per In the above regression equation, r is an index for the auction round, and ε is a stochastic shock that is assumed to be of constant variance and zero mean across all auction rounds.
Variable definitions are presented immediately below, and summary statistics for those variables are presented in Table 4 .
• ATTQ = Total quantity demanded for AT&T, smoothed.
• LogATTQ = Natural log of AT&T's smoothed quantity demanded
• Open-ATT = Smoothed, log of quantity demanded in the open, less AT&T's demand via Alaska Native
• Price = Average price paid for all spectrum at auction Table 4 here The coefficient on price in Equation 15 is interpreted to mean that a $1 increase in price will lead to a 38 percent decrease in the total quantity of spectrum that AT&T demands. The regression parameter on Price is statistically significant at the ninety-nine percent level. Also, the R 2 for the regression is 96 percent. The right hand side variable therefore explains most of the variation in the dependent variable-an attractive characteristic because the regression will be used for prediction purposes.
• PriceOpen = Price paid for the open licenses ----------------------Place
----------------------
PREDICTING AT&T'S DEMAND, AND TOTAL DEMAND, IN THE OPEN
The parameter estimates from (1) were suppressed by approximately 53 cents, because AT&T was allowed to bid on the closed licenses through Alaska Native.
To complete this section of the analysis, a price of $5.39 is substituted into AT&T's demand for spectrum, given by equation 15, to determine the spectrum AT&T would have had it been precluded from bidding in the closed. This quantity is determined to be 403.1 million MHzPop. 
AT&T'S SAVINGS

CONCLUSION
If the FCC were attempting to maximize the welfare of consumers of telecommunications services, it would choose an auction design to ensure (1) that the winning bidders placed the greatest value on the spectrum ("efficiency objective") and (2) that there were a sufficient number of winning bidders to yield competitive outcomes ("competition objective"). The diversity mandate imposed by Congress, however, constrained the FCC in its formulation. In particular, the diversity constraint required that the FCC take steps to insure a diversity of spectrum winners, even if the spectrum is most highly valued by the large incumbent carriers.
The FCC decided that, after the bankruptcies in prior set-aside auctions, small firms required additional investment capital to survive in the wireless industry. But that capital did not need to come from incumbent wireless operators. In particular, if additional wireless carriers could survive in the existing market, those carriers would receive backing in a financial market without liquidity constraints. However, the FCC's control standard allowed small firms to act as fronts for large wireless incumbents, thereby defeating the diversity constraint, because the licensees were neither different nor small. Thus, the FCC's standard likely met its efficiency criteria, but it did so at the expense of its competition objective and diversity requirements.
To an economist, the definition of control the FCC used in Auction 35-that is, ownership of a simple majority of voting shares or any other factors listed in its definition of de facto controlis of only limited value. But economic control comes from controlling a "critical" share of the affiliate's net cash flows. Because AT&T owns 80 percent of Alaska Native's net cash flows, AT&T likely has sufficient ownership of Alaska Native to possess economic control. The relevant question from a competition perspective is whether an incumbent (such as AT&T) owns a sufficient amount of an entrant's (such as Alaska Native's) equity such that it would be induced to raise prices in a unilateral fashion (relative to an outcome in which some third party obtained the new license).
The above test makes clear that neither voting control nor any variables that measure direct management control are sufficient to capture the concept of "control" as that term is normally understood by economists or the Commission. For example, neither "50 percent of the board of directors or management committee" nor the "authority to appoint, promote, demote, and fire senior executives" will affect the incumbent's primary economic objective-to maximize the sum of its own profits plus its pro-rata share of the profits of its front-when the incumbent sets its price (Auction 35 Public Notice). The Commission's test for de facto control instead contemplated full consideration of a broad range of control indicators, and under that test, a finding of control would clearly be compelled in this case.
In its second report and order in the matter of the implementation of the Commercial Spectrum Enhancement Act and modernization of the Commission's Competitive Bidding Rules and Procedures, the FCC revamped its definition of control. The FCC first eliminated the ability of any firm with "impermissable material relationships" from receiving designated entity benefits.
The FCC defined such a relationship as one in which a licensee "has agreements with one or more other entities for the lease (under either spectrum manager or de facto transfer leasing arrangements) or resale (including under a wholesale arrangement) of, on a cumulative basis, more than 50 percent of its spectrum capacity of any individual license." 31 Furthermore, the FCC defined an "attributable material relationship" as one where the designated entity in question leased or resold, on a cumulative basis, more than 25 percent of the capacity for any one license.
Therefore, the FCC's revised standards base control on ownership share of the essential input of production in question (spectrum), and should therefore be superior to those in force during Auction 35.
Although the FCC's current implementation of its designated entity program is likely an improvement upon its prior standard of control, the FCC should continue to monitor the relationship between designated entities and incumbent wireless carriers or scrap the program entirely. The prior policy, which resembled an affirmative action program on the surface but actually maintained the status quo, generated at least two types of harm. First, legitimate entrepreneurs who had little chance of winning licenses wasted scarce resources in preparing business plans and raising capital. Second, incumbent carriers wasted resources in creating front organizations to obtain set-aside spectrum. When AT&T exercises its option to acquire the next 40 percent of Alaska Native, the minority shareholders that went along with the scam will be unjustly enriched. The transactions costs of creating fronts are a pure waste of resources.
Consequently, the FCC's improved control standard should produce a more efficient allocation of resources in the marketplace and should better fulfill the mandate set by Congress by helping true entrants instead of further entrenching current incumbents. Because Alaska Native spent 4 times as much for closed spectrum than did Salmon, the paper focuses the analysis on the impact of Alaska Native's bidding. percent of all member interests in ANW. Under Section 1.2110(c)(2)(ii)(A) of the Commission's Rules, therefore, AWPI would be considered to hold not more than 80 percent of all member interests on a fully-diluted basis…").
5. Auction results are available for download at the FCC's web site <http://www.fcc.gov/wtb/auctions/35/charts/35markets.xls>. 6. It is quite possible that other incumbent carriers used fronts to gain access to the closed auction. Because Alaska Native so thoroughly dominated the closed auction, however, the paper focuses on Alaska Native's effect on the results.
7. The Commission has subsequently ruled that Nextel and other SMR providers operate in an antitrust market distinct from the mobile telephony market. At the time of Auction 35, however, SMR spectrum counted against the CSMR spectrum cap. However, it is likely that this is a special case; the FCC explicitly considers SMR to be part of CSMR in the spectrum cap proceeding. for small entrepreneurs, the FCC sacrificed efficiency (the highest-value bidder would not win the license) for the sake of promoting entry.
19. Salmon PCS reduced activity from two licenses in New York to one license at a price of $511 million for each license, and reduced activity from one license in New York to no licenses in New York at a price of $1.41 billion.
20. For a more thorough review of the rules in FCC spectrum auctions, see Cramton, 1997. 21 . MHzPop is the appropriate measure of quantity, because it captures the persons (pops) you can address with useable bandwidth (MHz).
22. Alaska Native raised its own high bid only once. In round 42 Alaska Native raised its own high bid on the C block New York City license.
23. There were in fact 101 auction rounds, the last round containing no new bids. Therefore, the demand curve between round 100 and round 101 is the same mapping of price to quantity, and is superfluous.
24. For this analysis the model uses Alaska Native's demand for AT&T's demand, and excludes bids made by "AT&T Wireless" in the auction. The reason for this exclusion is that AT&T wireless dropped out of the auction in round 32, after bidding on Bismark, ND, Fairbanks, AK, and Walla Walla, WA. Thus, it is clear that AT&T was willing to drop out of the auction, knowing that Alaska Native would win spectrum on its behalf. Therefore, AT&T's sincere demand is represented by Alaska Native's bids. 12,554, 12,555-56 (1994) , in which the Commission identified the following factors used to determine control of a business: (1) use of facilities and equipment; (2) control of day-to-day operations; (3) control of policy decisions; (4) personnel responsibilities; (5) control of financial obligations; and (6) receipt of monies and profits; Intermountain Microwave, 12 FCC 2d. 559 (1963) 
